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RICO: Are the Courts Construing the Legislative
History Rather Than the Statute Itself?.
I. Introduction
During its consideration and passage by Congress as well as during its
course through the courts, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization
Act (RICO),I "has been at the center of controversy.' '2 Legislators, 3 commentators, 4 dissenting judges5 as well as majority judges 6 have all expressed the
opinion that the statute is too broad and constitutes a snare for persons and activities within, as well as outside of, the statute's intended coverage. Three recent decisions have attempted to narrow various aspects of RICO's coverage.
In United States v. Mandel7 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, in a case of first impression, held that an organization's transferring a
part interest in itself to a racketeer in payment "for unconnected criminal activity" did not cause the organization "to become a racketeer influenced
organization proscribed by § 1962(c)," 8 despite the fact that section 1962(c)
provides, in pertinent part, that, "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person . ..
associated with any enterprise . . . to conduct . . . such enterprise's affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity." 9 In United States v. Marubeni
American Corp.5 0 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
likewise made the only case law on the issue holding that profits accruing to an
enterprise as a result of racketeering activity are not subject to RICO's
forfeiture provisions, despite the fact that section 1963(a)(1) provides, in pertinent part, that, "[w]hoever violates any provision of section 1962 .. .shall
1 18 U.S.C. £5 1961-1968 (1976).
2
3

Nat'l L. J. April 7, 1980, at 5.
See 116 CONG. REG. 35205, (1970) (remarks of Rep. Mikva):
[t]he salutary purposes for which this bill aimed at organized crime was intended, somehow never
come to fruition. Instead, the spread of the shotgun approach will involve a lot of activities not intended to be covered and will not be successful in addressing itself to the problems that were intended to be covered.
It will subject the courts, the prosecutors, and indeed every person who studies the law to incredible burdens and problems in trying to decipher, administer, and uphold some of the provisions that we are about to enact.
The overreach, the looseness of the language, the whimsy in this bill just simply do not
enhance the legislative process.
4 See, e.g., Atkinson, "Racketeer InfluencedandCorrupt Organizations," 18 U.S. C. §§ 1961-68: Broadest of the
Federal Criminal Statutes, 69J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 1 (1978). The author describes RICO as "a sweeping act which intrudes on state power and has great potential for abuse against individual defendants." Id.
at 18; Note, Racketeers and Non-Racketeers Alike Should FearFlorida'sRICO Act, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REv., 483
(1978). In commenting upon Florida's enactment of a statute "patterned after" (id. at 484) RICO, the
author concludes that "[t]he very broad definition of 'racketeering activity' makes the RICO statute a
potential candidate for prosecutorial abuse." Id. at 506.
5 United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 311-12 (7th Cir. 1979). (Swygert,J., dissenting), cert denied,
48 U.S.L.W. 3611 (U.S. March 25, 1980) (No. 79-1009). United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 107-11 (2d
Cir. 1976) (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting), cert. denied sub nom. Napoli v. United States, 429 U.S. 1039
(1977).
6 United States v. Marubeni America Corp. 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Sutton,
605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1374-75 (4th Cir. 1979.)
7 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cii'. 1979).
8 Id. at 1376.
9 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976).
10 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980).
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forfeit to the United States . . . any interest he has acquired or maintained in
violation of section 1962."11 In United States v. Sutton 12 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, marking a split with every other circuit court
deciding the issue, held that RICO's coverage under section 1962(c) extends
only to a legitimate enterprise which is operated by a "pattern of racketeering
activity." The court held RICO inapplicable to racketeering enterprises of an
entirely illicit nature, 13 despite the fact that section 1962(c) provides, in pertinent part that, "[it shall be unlawful for any person . . . associated with any
enterprise . . . to conduct . . . such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of

racketeering activity ..
."14
The restrictive reading given the statute by the Mandel, Marubeni and Sutton courts as well as various commentators 15 threatens RICO's continued
usefulness in controlling organized crime. More significantly, the process by
which these courts have interpreted and applied the statute warrants a close
analysis. To the extent these decisions encourage judicial lawmaking, their impact upon the continued judicial treatment of RICO ultimately may be more
significant than their precedential impact on the isolated issues involved.
II. The Mandel Decision
In United States v. Mandel, 16 the Fourth Circuit held that the defendants'
transfer of an interest in an enterprise to then-Governor of Maryland Marvin
Mandel as payment for fraudulent conduct regarding legislation favorable to
the defendants 17 did not, "absent other proof not present in this record,'18
11 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1) (1976).
12 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979).
13 Id. at 270.
14 18 U.S.C. 5 1962(c) (1977).
15 See notes 3-6 supra. The American Bar Association has solicited opinions on whether RICO ought to
be reworded by amendment to narrow its scope. 26 GRIM. L. REP. 2282 (1979). "Criminal defense lawyers
are enraged by the law. Stanley S. Arkin of New York called it a 'cruel' statute because of the penalty provisions. George Collins of Chicago said... 'it is a totalitarian law which invites prosecutorial abuse.' " Nat'l
L.J., Nov. 26, 1979, at 12.
16 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979).
17 "The fact developed at trial touching upon the alleged bribery of the Governor and the alleged
misrepresentation and concealment of material information by appellants were essentially uncontroverted."
Id. at 1354.
The evidence established that several months after Mandel vetoed a bill favorable to the
Marlboro Racetrack, his co-defendants acquired a controlling interest in the track. Twelve days
later, the Maryland General Assembly, which had been misled by some of the defendants about
the true identity of the track's new owners, overrode Mandel's veto without opposition from
Mandel or his legislative aides. During the same period, some of Mandel's co-defendants secretly
made an attractive real estate investment available to him. Subsequently, Mandel lobbied
strenuously for the passage of a racing consolidation bill that would have benefitted Marlboro
greatly. At the same time, certain co-defendants conveyed to Mandel an interest in other
valuable real estate [the transaction in question in this note] and gave him generous gifts. All of
this was accomplished in part through use of the mails.
Id. at 1386. The defendants were convicted in the trial court. On appeal, the convictions were reversed "for
trial error," id. at 1357, because the fraud aspect of the case was brought on a slightly inaccurate theory and
because thejury instructions were not sufficiently detailed. Id. at 1364. The trial court acquitted the defendants of their RICO charge for transferring their interest in the real estate venture and the circuit court affirmed this acquittal. Id. at 1376.
18 591 F.2d at 1376. In the majority's words: "The dispute [at trial] centered on the proper inferences
that could be drawn from these facts." Id. at 1354. This dispute continued even into the circuit court decision since the dissenting judge concluded that from the evidence "the jury could find beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendants.. . engaged in a scheme to defraud." Id. at 1386. Although the circuit court ruled
out the possibility of the transfer in question having been made pursuant to a scheme to benefit the
transferors, the wording of their decision makes it clear that even had there been a connection between the
bribery and the transfer, the transfer would still not have been a violation under 18 U.S.C. 1962(c) (1977):
"[T]he simple transfer of an ownership interest in that business does not constitute the conduct of the
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constitute the conduct of an enterprise by means of a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of section 1962 of RICO. 19 The court's conclusion was based
upon a questionable analysis of RICO's language, an unjustifiably shortsighted view of the facts, and a failure to recognize the implications of the
holding.
The circuit court's opinion included a restatement of the district court's
analysis of the structure of section 1962(c). This analysis relied heavily upon
the statement of purpose enacted in conjunction with the statute. 20 Unfortunately, this analysis is not of any true value in deciding the RICO issue dealt
with in Mandel. 21 The district court's examination of the structure of section
1962 results only in the court grudgingly 22 concluding that section 1962(c)
covers "the situation where a present owner or employee of a business begins
to operate the business through a pattern of racketeering activity.' '23 Comparing the statement of legislative purpose 24 with the language of section 1962(c),
the court concluded that "the words 'operation of any enterprise' were meant
to describe the phrase 'conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs.' ,25 Although both the district and circuit
business through a pattern of racketeering activity even if the transfer is part of an allegedpayoff in a mailfraud
scheme." 591 F.2d at 1376 (emphasis added).
19 18 U.S.C. S 1962(c) (1976).
20 H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1970] U.S. ConE CONG. & AD. NEws 4007.
This title creates a new chapter in title 18, entitled "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations," which contains a threefold standard (1) making unlawful the receipt or use of income from "racketeering activity" or its proceeds by a principal in commission of the activity to
acquire an interest in or establish an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce; (2) prohibiting
the acquisition of any enterprise in interstate commerce through a "pattern" of"racketeering activity," and (3) proscribing operation of any enterprise engaged in interstate commerce through
a "pattern" of "racketeering activity."
Id. at 4010.
21 "Most formal statements of purpose in bills or committee reports tend to be innocuous generalities
designed to offend the least number of people, a fact that destroys most of their usefulness for resolving
specific uncertainties of meaning." R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 91
(1975).
22 See note 62 infra for a discussion of a more generous reading of the interrelation of § 1962's subsections.
23 591 F.2d at 1375. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976) provides that:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code,
to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in
acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on
the open market for purposes of investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under
this subsection if the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate
family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern or racketeering activity of the collection of an
unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect
one or more directors of the issuer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through
collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of

24
25

racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
See note 20 supra.
591 F.2d at 1375.
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courts attach significance to this finding, the fact that "conducting an enterprise's affairs" under the statute must involve "operating an enterprise" simply begs the question of whether transferring an interest in an enterprise in
payment for racketeering activity by a third party constitutes the operation of
any enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of section
1962(c).
The circuit court offered further analysis of the wording of section 1962(c)
which likewise shed little light on the issue in Mandel. The court observed that
"use of the word 'through' in the statute would seem to require proof of some
connection between the pattern of racketeering activity and the conducting or
operating of the business.' '26 This observation adds little to the discussion
since, arguably, there seems to be proof of some connection between the
bribery and the transfer in an interest insofar as the former was accomplished
in return for the latter. 27 The question still remains whether transferring an interest in an enterprise is an aspect of conducting or operating the enterprise.
The court cited United States v.Nerone28 as support for the proposition that a
RICO offense requires a connection between the enterprise in question and the
racketeering activity. On its facts, however, Nerone differs significantly from
Mandel. Nerone involved a section 1962(c) prosecution against a mobile home
park for running a gambling casino in one of the mobile homes in the park.
The RICO charge against the mobile home park failed because the only connection between the mobile home park and the gambling operation was a mere
"geographical juxtaposition.' '29 Since there was a direct connection between
the transfer of an interest in the defendants' enterprise and the racketeering activity involved in the bribery scheme, Mandel involved a direct connection not
present in Nerone. Thus, the holding in Nerone is simply irrelevant to Mandel.
The court also noted that "without the word 'through,' anyone who used
income from a legitimate business to participate in racketeering activity would
be guilty of a violation of section 1962(c)." Despite the apparent incredulity
with which the court made this comment, such a reading of section 1962(c) is
not entirely unthinkable. The operator of a business, insofar as he uses the
profits of that business to underwrite racketeering activity, may be said to
operate that business so that part, if not all, of its operations in fact constitute a
pattern of racketeering activity.
The circuit court endorsed the district court's finding that the transfer of a
proprietary interest by the defendants did not constitute conduct proscribed by
section 1962(c). The district court had concluded that: (1) a "transfer of an in26
27
28
29

Id.
See note 18 supra.
563 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 852. The Nerone court further observed that
The problem with the Government's case, however, is that the indictment charged that the
affairs of the mobile home park corporation, not the casino operation, were conducted through a
pattern of racketeering activity. Our examination of the record leaves us with the abiding conviction that the Government never really crystalized its theory of the case. It made no attempt to
show that the proceeds of the casino operation were invested in Maple Manor, Inc. nor did it
endeavor to show that gambling revenues were used by or in any way channeled into the corporation or that persons were paid out of gambling revenues to perform services for Maple Manor,
Inc.

Id. at 851.
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terest in a business is the antithesis of operating it"; (2) it was significant that
"Mandel's interest was purely passive" and "he was not entitled to," nor did
he possess "any management role" and, (3) "while Congress specifically
outlawed acquisition of a business through a pattern of racketeering activity it
did not specifically proscribe the transfer of an interest in an enterprise. '
Each of these findings is questionable.
First, transferring an interest in an enterprise is not necessarily antithetical to operating it. In a purely semantic sense, transferring ownership
and control of an enterprise is perhaps the exact opposite of operating and retaining control of an enterprise. However, even were an owner to divest
himself entirely of his ownership of an enterprise, it would not be unlikely that
he should remain in charge of the business's day-to-day operations. More
significantly, establishing and maintaining the capital structure and control
distribution of an enterprise, particularly one owned and controlled by a small
number of individuals,3 1 is an essential aspect of the operation of any enterprise. Certainly a corporation transferring part interest in itself to a supplier as
part of a larger transaction aimed at obtaining a more profitable arrangement
between that supplier and the transferor would regard such a transaction as not
only vital but perhaps absolutely essential to its continued profitability. In the
same way, the transfer of an interest in the defendants' enterprise to Mandel in
return for legislative favors benefiting the defendants was arguably part of the
operation of the enterprise.
Second, the fact that Mandel was ostensibly "passive" or not engaged in
the "management" of the enterprise has no bearing on the charge involved.
The indictment charged the transferorsof the interest to Mandel with conducting
the enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. 32 Mandel's
action was part of the bribery scheme which constituted a necessary part of the
defendants' conducting their business through a pattern of racketeering activity. In a determination of the validity of the court's decision the crucial activity
to be considered is the defendants' transfer of an interest to Mandel in payment
for allegedly fraudulent activity. Whether or not Mandel became an active
member in the limited partnership after acquisition of his interest is irrelevant.
Additionally, section 1962(c) makes no requirement that the person charged be
entitled to any particular degree of managerial responsibility. The statute provides only that "any person employed by or associatedwith" the corrupt enterprise
33
shall be criminally liable.
Third, in attaching undue significance to Congress' failure to explicitly
proscribe the transfer of an interest in an enterprise, the district court and the
circuit court ignored a basic assumption about the meaning of words and interpretation of statutes. A statute cannot specifically and expressly indicate the
proper disposition of the infinite number of possible cases arising within the
statute's scope. Determining the scope of statutes and applying them to individual fact situations inevitably requires a certain amount of deductive or in30
31
three
32
33

591 F.2d at 1376.
Security Investments Company was owned by a number of persons in addition to Mandel and the
other defendants named in the Count.
591 F.2d at 1353.
18 U.S.C. S 1962(c) (1976).
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ductive thought on the part of a conscientious court.3 4 Sometimes a statute may
not proscribe one type of activity since it specifically proscribes another. Such
35
situations are covered by the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
3 6
However, the maxim is not always applicable. Certainly to say that because
section 1962(a) deals specifically with the acquisition of interests, section
1962(c), wihich uses the general language of conduct or participation, does not
include the disposition of interests, simply ignores the implied meaning of
1962(c). In short, expressio unius est exclusio alterius has no applicability to section
1962(c) in determining whether the statute intends a transfer of an interest to
be considered a part of conducting an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.
The circuit court concluded that even though an enterprise may transfer
an interest in itself in payment "for unconnected criminal activity ...this -fact
does not, in itself, cause the business, the interest in which is transferred to
become a racketeer influenced organization proscribed by 1962(c) ....,,3"
The
court based its holding on its finding that any other reading of the statute would
not be supported by "the language of the statute" or "the legislative history,"
and would be "impermissibly broad." ' 38 The court's conclusion and the
assumptions upon which it is based are unsound for three reasons.
First, the court spoke of enterprises becoming "racketeer influenced
organizations proscribed by 1962(c)." ' 39 The most casual reading of section
1962(c) reveals that the section proscribes conduct and not organizations. This
statement demonstrates the court's confusion as to the statute's actual wording, as well as the substantive nature of the change in question. Second, as
discussed above, 40 the language of section 1962 may very well proscribe the
transfer of an interest as part of a pattern of racketeering activity.
Third, the legislative history cited by the court is entirely mute on the
issue of whether transferring an interest in an enterprise constitutes the operation of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. 4 ' Legislative
history can be more vague than the statute which a court is called upon to interpret4 2 and, more often than not, there is nothing in the legislative history that
deals specifically with a particular point in issue.4 3 The Organized Crime Control Act's legislative history does contain an example of an analogous situation
upon which a court could base a restrictive interpretation of the statute. In an
exchange with the Act's sponsor, Representative Sikes made clear that another
section of the act, providing stiff penalties for use of explosives in interstate
commerce, would not apply to farmers and amateur hunters. 4 4 Had there been
a similarly unequivocal exchange on the congressional floor regarding the point
34 R. DICKERSON, supra note 21, at 40-41.
35 "A maxim of statutory interpretation meaning that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of
another." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1521 (5th ed. 1979).
36 R. DICKERSON, supra note 21, at 47.
37 591 F.2d at 1376.
38 591 F.2d at 1376.
39 See note 37 supra.
40 See text accompanying notes 29-36 supra.
41 See note 20 supra.
42 United States v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 345 U.S. 297, 320 (1953).
43 R. DICKERSON, supra note 21, at 154.
44 116 CONG. Rac. 35310 (1970) (Remarks of Rep. Sikes).

NOTES
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at issue in Mandel, a court would be justified in restricting the scope of section
1962(c). However, since there is no specific legislative history on the question
of whether transferring an interest in an enterprise is proscribed by section
1962(c), there is no merit in asserting that the legislative history either supports
or negates a restrictive reading of section 1962(c).
Finally, the court's concern that a reading of section 1962(c) proscribing
the transfer of an interest in connection with racketeering activity would be
"impermissibly broad" is questionable. If a court can, in good faith, find no
basis for a restrictive interpretation and the wording of the statute would allow
such a broad interpretation, unless such an unrestricted reading would render
the statute unconstitutional in whole or in part, there is no reason for favoring a
restrictive reading. 45 Despite numerous challenges, RICO has been held constitutional by every court considering the matter. 46 Certainly a person paying a
bribe would be hard-pressed to make a valid argument that he had not been
warned of the illegality of the act. Thus, since there is nothing compelling the
court to make a restrictive reading of section 1962(c), the court's insistence on
such a course of action is totally unjustified. In conclusion, the Fourth Circuit's
holding that section 1962(c) does not prohibit the transfer of an interest as payment for an unconnected bribery scheme is unjustified in light of the wording
of the statute and the facts of Mandel.
III. The Marubeni Decision
In United States v. MarubeniAmerican Corp., 47 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that section 1963(a)(1), 48 providing for the
49
forfeiture of interests acquired or maintained in violation of section 1962,
does not apply to income earned by an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity. 50 As in Mandel, the Ninth Circuit's misreading of RICO
and misuse of legislative history result in an unduly restrictive interpretation of
the statute. Th circuit court began its analysis by reviewing the holding on the
district court level.
A. The District Court's Ruling

In construing the statute's forfeiture provision, the district court focused
on the meaning of "interest" as used in the statute in order to determine
R. DICKERSON, supra note 21, at 200.
46 Atkinson, supra note 4, at 3.
47 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980). In Marubeni the Government contended that a local representative of
Marubeni America Corporation, a supplier of telephone cable, bribed a local official of an Alaskan
telephone utility in return for confidential bidding information on four supply contracts. Based on its bids,
Marubeni and another supplier were awarded three of the four contracts worth over $8.8 million. After each
award was received, the bribed official allegedly received part of the local representative's commission. The
Government charged Marubeni and the other supplier and a corporate officer of each with violations of 18
U.S.C. § 1962(c). The count at issue on appeal demanded that Marubeni and the other supplier forfeit to
the Government the income derived from the illegally obtained contracts pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
1963(a)(1). The district court dismissed the charges and the proceedings were suspended pending the
Government's appeal of that dismissal.
48 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1) (1977). See text accompanying note 60 infra.
45

49

See note 23 supra.

50

611 F.2d at 766.
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whether "interest" could be interpreted to include "income," as well as a proprietary interest. Since section 1963(a)(1) calls for forfeiture of interests "acquired or maintained in violation of section 1962," the court concluded that
the meaning of "interest" as used in section 1962 would be determinative of
the matter. 51 Since "interest" appears with "in an enterprise" whenever it appears in section 1962, the court concluded that when "interest" appears in
1963(a)(1), it likewise means "interest in an enterprise." Unfortunately, such
a conclusion sheds little light upon the question of whether income can be an
"interest" or even an "interest in an enterprise," and only begs the question.
The district court asserted that since section 1962(a) speaks of racketeering
"income," the legislature could not have intended to include "income" within
the meaning of "interest as used in 1963(a)(1)." Significantly, since section
1962(a) provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person
who has received any income derived, directly ... from a pattern of racketeering activity ... to use ... such income, in ... the. . . operation of any enterprise . . . ,",52 section 1962(a) evidences a congressional intent that the use of

racketeering income for operating an enterprise is a violation of section 1962.
Further, section 1962(b) provides, in pertinent part, that "it shall be unlawful
for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity . . . to . . . maintain
. . . any interest in . . . any enterprise." ' 53 To the extent that both of these

subsections evince an intent to prevent the operation and maintenance of
enterprises through racketeering activity, any interest so maintained or
operated seems clearly forfeitable as an interest under 1963(a)(1).
B. Construing the One-Percent Investment Exception
The court further argued that racketeering income is not forfeitable under
1963(a)(1) by analyzing the second sentence of section 1962(a), which the court
terms the "1 % Exception." '4 The court described section 1962(a) as no more
than "the general prohibition against investing income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity." 55 This description of the first
sentence of section 1962(a) is, at best, inaccurate. In its entirety, the first
sentence of section 1962(a) provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through
collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or
invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such
income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of,
any enterprise which is56 engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate
or foreign commerce.
As is evident from even a casual reading, in addition to proscribing the invest51

Id.

52
53
54

18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976).
18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1976).
See text accompanying notes 56 and 58.

55 611 F.2d at 766.
56

18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976).
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ment of racketeering income, the statute also proscribes the use of such income
in the "establishment or operation of any enterprise." 5 7 Thus, section 1962(a) has
a broader purpose than the court incorrectly assessed. Section 1962(a) proscribes the use of racketeering income in: (1) the acquisition of interests in
enterprises, (2) the establishment of enterprises, or (3) the operation of enterprises.
In the light of the broader coverage of section 1962(a) the impact of the socalled one percent exception can be more readily ascertained. The second
sentence of section 1962(a) provides that:
A purchase of securities on the open market for the purposes of investment,
and without the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the
issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern or racketeering activity of the collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount
in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class,
and do not confer, either
in law or in fact, the power to elect one ormore
58
directors of the issuer.
Clearly, the second sentence of section 1962(a) provides an exception to only
one aspect of section 1962(a) coverage. Nevertheless, the court asserted that
section 1962(a) "tells racketeers they may not invest illegal income in enterprises unless they purchase corporate stock without the intent or ability to influence the issuer." 5 9 Thus, the court construed the exception as a "safe harbor" rule for racketeers building a portfolio of publicly traded stock. The court
was unwilling to admit that this construction is incongruous with the rest of a
statute intended to proscribe various aspects of criminal enterprises.
The one percent exception is susceptible to a different interpretation.
Assume a racketeer uses racketeering income to acquire, establish or operate
an enterprise. Prior to RICO, the racketeer could have been convicted on the
basis of various discrete criminal charges involved in the generation of income
from the enterprise. The racketeer was firied and incarcerated. During his stay
in prison, the enterprise continued to operate the convict's illegally acquired
and operated enterprise. Upon his release from prison, the now ex-convict
returned to his enterprise, which remained intact and prospered during his
absence under the management of others. Under RICO's forfeiture provision,
this sequence of events is less likely since, under the forfeiture provision, the
racketeer's interest in the enterprise must be forfeited to the United States. Section 1963(a)(2) provides, in pertinent part, that "[w]hoever violates any provision of section 1962 ... shall forfeit to the United States ... any interest in [or]
security of. . . any enterprise which he has established, operated, controlled,
conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of section 1962. "60
This provision seems directed at not only penalizing the individual racketeer,
but also seeks to penalize his corrupt enterprise as well by requiring it to forfeit
57 Id. (emphasis added).
58 Id.
59 611 F.2d at 767.

60 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(2) (1976).
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to the government that share of its equity attributable to the racketeer's ownership and involvement. This intention is explicit in section 1964 which provides
61
for the possibility of a court requiring a total dissolution of the enterprise.
This forfeiture would be an effective and valuable tool for stunting the continued growth of corrupt enterprises during as well as after an individual
racketeer's imprisonment. The threat of such forfeiture would, however, be a
great inconvenience for large, publicly traded corporations whose contact with
the racketeer is attributable to only an insignificant ownership of stock. Thus,
the one percent exception seems to be directed at preventing unnecessary
disruption of publicly held legitimate enterprises.
The court is unjustified in implying that since the one percent exception is
intended to provide racketeers a means to invest in public securities it is indicative of congressional unwillingness to require the forfeiture of racketeering
income. The one percent exception seems more likely intended to protect
public corporations and the securities markets from the disruptive effect of
government-required forfeitures of de minimus holdings by racketeers or their
affiliates. Additionally, since the one percent exception is applicable to only a
single aspect of the triple proscription section of 1962(a), the exception's provisions should not be applied to section 1962(a) in its entirety.
C. The Relationship Among Section 1962's Prohibitory Provisions
In construing section 1962 as a whole, the court asserted that "[i]f
racketeering income were a forfeitable interest," such a reading would not only
defeat the one percent investment exception but would render subsections
1962(a) and (b) redundant because there is "no meaningful distinction between monetary income and income in the form of an ownership interest in or
control of an enterprise." 6 2 The court concluded that congress did not write "§
1962(a) and (b) only to make both extraneous by imposing forfeiture for
1962(c) violations .... "63 The court's conclusion is unjustified in that it
misconstrues both section 1962 and section 1963(a).
First, the separate functions of sections 1962(a), (b) and (c) are more obvious than the court made them appear. Rather than being concerned with
various types of income, the three subsections are intended to deal with the
various component aspects of the operation of a criminal- or racketeer-influenced enterprise. 64 The activities can be most properly viewed as parts of a continuum. Section 1962(a) concerns itself directly with the use of racketeering income in the acquisition, establishment or operation of an enterprise. Section
1962(b) concerns itself directly with the use of racketeering techniques in the
61

62
63
64

18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1976) provides that:
The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders, including, but not limited to:
ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments of any person, including, but
not limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making due provision for the rights of innocent persons.
611 F.2d at 767.
Id.
Significantly, the section is entitled "Prohibited activities."
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acquisition or maintenance of an interest in, or control of, an enterprise. Section 1962(c) further broadens the entire section's scope by proscribing the
operation of an enterprise by an employee or an associate of the enterprise by
means of racketeering activities. Thus, the various subsections of section 1962
are aimed at insuring that the statute's proscriptive effect is broad enough to
include the entire range of activities of individual racketeers and corrupt
organizations.
Second, to imply, as did the court, that section 1963(a)(1) forfeitures may
only occur in cases of section 1962(a) violations, is a flagrant misreading of section 1963(a)(1). The statute provides simply that "[w]hoever violates anyprovision of section 1962 ... shall forfeit to the United States ... any interest he has
acquired or maintained in violation of section 1962." '65 Section 1963(a)(1) simply does not restrict forfeiture to any one subsection of section 1962. Thus,
there is no reason why a violation of 1962(c) should not trigger forfeiture of an
interest in any form.
Thus, a court may look to section 1962(a) or section 1962(b) to ascertain
other proscribed racketeering activities, or to ascertain what interests are
forfeitable, given the construction of section 1962 and the wording of section
1963(a)(1). Nevertheless, there is no validity to the assertion that requiring
forfeiture of income on the basis of a section 1962(c) violation would make
"surplusage" of section 1962(a) and section 1962(b).
D. Construing RICO's Legislative History
The court discussed three documents of RICO's legislative history to support its holding that forfeiture of racketeering income cannot be demanded
under section 1963(a)(1) since only interests in an enterprise are forfeitable.
The court first referred to the differences between two bills 66 introduced in
67
Congress, only one of which was ultimately enacted as RICO's final version.
Although the court only engaged in consideration of this legislative history to
conclude again that "interest" as used in the statute means only "interest in
an enterprise," this conclusion shed little light on the issue of whether income
is forfeitable.6 8 Even the practice of comparing an enacted statute against the
form it took as a bill is questionable. In Justice Holmes' words, "[i]t is a
delicate business to base speculations about the purposes or construction of a
statute upon the vicissitudes of its passage.' '69
The court also referred to an excerpt from a letter 70 on RICO's constitutionality, written by then-Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst, to
reinforce their belief that "interest" means only an "interest in an
enterprise." The remarks of a deputy attorney general on a tangential matter
should have little bearing on a court's attempt to determine a statute's meaning

65
66
67
68
69
70

18 U.S.C. 5 1963(a) (1) (1976) (emphasis added).
S. 1861, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) and S. 30, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
611 F.2d at 767-68.
See text accompanying note 51 supra.
Pine Hill Coal Co. v. United States, 259 U.S. 191, 196 (1922).
611 F.2d at 768.
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and its applicability to a particular situation. The deputy attorney general's
understanding of the statute should not influence the court's determination of
the congressional intent in enacting RICO.
The court referred to the House and Senate reports to again underscore
the notion that "interest" only means interest in an enterprise. 71 Ironically,
the quote from the Senate report only emp hasizes the subjectivity inherent in a
court's attempt to assign a specific meaning to an ambiguous scrap of
legislative history. 72 The Senate report speaks of "interest" as an " 'interest'
of any type in the enterprise.' ' A court attempting to argue that income is a
forfeitable interest could have emphasized the words "of any type" to support
their belief that "interest" should include "income." Nevertheless, the court
quoted further from the Senate report, emphasizing the statement that "where
an organization is acquired or run by defined racketeering methods, then the
persons involved can be legally separated from the organization, either by the
criminal law approach of fine, imprisonment and forfeiture ....
74 From this
statement, the court concluded that "Congress plainly imposed criminal
forfeiture to separate racketeers from the enterprises they owned, controlled or
operated and not to attack racketeering broadsides." 75 In a footnote, the court
continued, asserting that:
"3

'

We believe anyone who reads the legislative history must be struck by the
single-mindedness with which Congress drafted RICO. Congress declared
over and over again that its purpose was to rid legitimate organizations of the
influence of organized
crime. This purpose must be the linchpin of any con76
struction of RICO.
This statement raises a number of disturbing doubts about the court's process of interpreting RICO. Although the court speaks of the "singlemindedness" with which Congress drafted RICO, one commentator notes that
the "folly of any attempt to conjure up a legislative intent has been asserted so
often that many respectable scholars refuse to recognize the concept." 77 Further, "[e]ven if a unanimous legislative intent were knowable, it would be
powerless to bind the courts, because the legislators' function is not to impose
their respective wills but to 'pass statutes.' ''78 In short, the court's reliance
upon its speculation as to what the legislative history reveals as to the intent of
the statute creates too great an area for impermissible subjectivity. The court is
not entitled to conclude from the legislative history, rather than the statute,
that the congressional intent was "not to attack racketeering broadsides."
Although the court makes every effort to appear faithful to its constitutionally
mandated 79 role as an interpreter of statutes rather than lawmaker, the court's
71 611 F.2d at 768-69, citing H. R. REP. No. 1549, note 20 supra, and S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong. 1st
Sess. 78, 78-80 (1969).
72 See text accompanying note 42 supra.
73 611 F.2d at 768 (the court's emphasis).
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 R. DICKERSON, supra note 21, at 68, and authorities cited therein.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 7.
The first assumption [of the process ofjudicial interpretation] is that the general powers of government
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subjectivity is most evident in its closing remarks. Noting that the government
contends that "forfeiture is the only effective penalty against corporate
racketeers," the court disagreed and concluded that, "if corporate officers are
fined, imprisoned and divested of their interests in the enterprise, their successors are unlikely to imitate their misconduct." 80 Clearly, the most challenging aspect of the prosecution of organized crime, and the aspect of organized
crime to which RICO is most specifically addressed, is organized crime's ability to continue to function without interruption despite the removal of one of its
members. RICO, contrary to the Marubeni court's blithe, assumption, is
predicated upon the finding that fine, imprisonment and divestiture of any
single individual is unlikely to have any substantially adverse effect upon the
corrupt enterprise or its members. 81 Thus, by taking an unjustifiably restrictive
view of the language of the statute, and by unnecessarily and carelessly resorting to legislative history, the Marubeni court reached a decision which is
arguably diametrically opposed to the intent of the statute.
IV. The Sutton Decision
In United States v. Sutton,8 2 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, marking a split of opinion on the issue with other circuits, 83 held that
as it is used in section 1962(c), the term "enterprise" includes only legitimate
enterprises. 84 Thus, in the Sixth Circuit's opinion, RICO proscribes only
racketeer infiltration of legitimate enterprises and is powerless against "merely" 85 illegitimate criminal. enterprises.
A. The Statute Itself
The court began its analysis "with the language of the statute," quoting
section 1962(c) and paraphrasing the definitions of "racketeering activity" and
"pattern of racketeering" appearing in section 1961.86 The court stated the
are constitutionally allocated amoung the three central branches in such a way that, although it does not
have an exclusive power to make substantive law, the legislative branch exercises lawmaking power that
takes precedence over the lawmaking powers respectively exercised by the executive and judicial branches."
Id. and authorities cited therein.
80 611 F.2d at 769.
81 See discussion of the one percent exception rationale at note 61 supra.
82 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979).
83 See United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 568-69 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Swiderski, 593
F.2d 1246, 1248-49 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2055, 2056 (1979); United States v. Malatesta,
583 F.2d 748, 754 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978), raod)fledon othergrounds en banc, 590 F.2d 1379(5th Cir.), cert. deniedsub
nom. Bertolotti v. United States, 440 U.S. 962 (1979); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 897 (5th Cir.),
cert. deniedsubnor. Delph v. United States, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064,
1072-73 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denid, 434 U.S. 1020 (197.7); United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407, 415-16
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. deniedsub nom. Napoli v. United States, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); United States v. Morris,
532 F.2d 436, 441-42 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472, 479 (5th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Capetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1358 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975). Contra, United
States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979).
84 605 F.2d at 270.
85 Id. at 264.
86 605 F.2d at 262.
"Racketeering activity" is defined in section 1961(1) as including numerous federal offenses
involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, extortion or drugs punishable under
state law by imprisonment for more than one year. A "pattern or racketeering activity" is defined by section 1961(5) as requiring at least two acts of racketeering committed within ten years
of each other.
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government's argument as consisting of three parts. First, the statute does not
distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate enterprises, expressly referring
to "any enterprise. " 87 Second, the definition of enterprise in the statute is a
broad one. 88 Third, since the appellants were an enterprise under the statutory
definition and had met the statutory requirement for a pattern of racketeering
activity, they were guilty of a RICO offense.8 9 Although it considered the
government's approach to the meaning of "enterprise" deceptively literal and
no more than a "guise of rigorous fidelity to the text," the court, contradicting
itself, admitted that "[o]f course, it is beyond dispute that the statute must be
read to cover 'any enterprise.' "90
Despite the court's insistence that their discontent with the Government's
argument is based upon a reading of the wording of the statute, it seems clear
that the court's reading of the statute was clouded by a preconception of th6 impact of the legislative history on the matter. 9' Although there are several explanations for why federal courts resort so avidly to legislative history in construing statutes, 92 the statutory text should be read, at least initially, without
benefit of legislative history. 93 Apparently convinced that the legislative history
provides that RICO is intended only to include infiltration of legitimate enterprises, the court was evidently intent on finding various problems with the
wording of the statute itself. This fact is most evident in the very strained
analysis the court makes of section 1962.
The court expressed its belief that "the statutory definition [of enterprise]
is silent regarding the attributes or activities these units must assume or undertake before they may be deemed an 'enterprise' in any meaningful sense." 94
Asserting that individuals and groups do not become 'enterprises' except in
relation to something they do," the court concluded that the definition of enterprise in section 1964 (1) is "incomplete because it does not tell us what that
something is." 9- The Government's obvious answer to the artificial problem
raised by the court was that racketeering activity is what the statute determines
to be the level of activity necessary to make an enterprise an enterprise. The
court rejected this sound answer and maintained that a reading of the statute
87 Id. at 264 (the court's emphasis).
88 18 U.S.C. 1961 (4) (1977) provides that " 'enterprise' includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although
not a legal entity."
89
The government's evidence showed both a significant heroin distribution business and a largevolume stolen property fencing operation. They were centered in the Cincinnati, Ohio, area and
involved many of the same figures ....
It was the government's theory of the case that these were
not discrete criminal ventures but were merely separate departments of a unitary "criminal
enterprise" under the management and control of [Sutton and another defendant].
605 F.2d at 263.
90 605 F.2d at 265.
91 See text accompanying notes 107-25 supra.
92
One reason is the belief that [legislative history] improves [the court's] access to actual legislative
intent. Supporting this belief is the assumption that the authors of statutes somehow communicate more successfully outside statutes than inside them. Another reason is that many courts
feel a higher fidelity to legislative intent than they do to the official, constitutional vehicles for expressing that intent."
R. DICKERSON, supra note 21, at 137.
93 Id. at 139. "Though we may not end with the words in construing a disputed statute, one certainly
begins there." Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Readng of Statutes, 47 COLUM L. REv. 727,735 (1947).
94 605 F.2d at 265.
95 Id.
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which requires racketeering as the only prerequisite for a covered enterprise
"renders the 'enterprise' element of the crime wholly redundant and
transforms the statute into a simple proscription against 'patterns of racketeering activity.' "96 The court based its conclusion largely on their belief that
since the wording of section 1962(c) is "so complex a formulation," a
"straightforward prohibition against engaging in 'patterns of racketeering activity' would have sufficed, and there would have been no need for a reference
'97
to 'enterprise' of any sort."
Rather than "purposeless circumlocution,' '98 the structure of section
1962(c) is a product of that section's relationship to the other sections of 1962. 99
The concept of enterprise is essential to all of the subsections of section 1962.
Subsection 1962 (a) deals with the use of racketeering income to acquire an interest in an enterprise or to establish or operate an enterprise. 100 Subsection
1962(a) proscribes the acquisition or maintenance of an enterprise by means of
racketeering activity. 101 Subsection 1962(c) prohibits the operation of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity in the following terms:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterpriseengaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise's affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of
10 2
unlawful debt.
Given the centrality of "enterprise" to all of the subsections of section 1962,
subsection 1962(c)'s double use of the word "enterprise" is hardly redundant.
Arguably, the wording of section 1962(c) has a number of complementary
functions. First, assuming, arguendo, that an enterprise within RICO's
coverage may be either entirely illegitimate or legitimate but racketeer influenced, subsection 1962(c), as worded, takes both possibilities into account.
For example, if an "employee" of an entirely illegitimate enterprise conducts
the illegitimate enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity,
his conduct is proscribed. In this case, the term "such enterprise" serves simply as an explicit reference to the enterprise referred to earlier in the subsection. On the other hand, if the employee is associated with a largely legitimate
enterprise and the employee conducts some of the legitimate enterprise's affairs
through racketeering activity, the term "such enterprise" refers to the
legitimate enterprise which, in the court's words, has an identity conceptually
10 3
distinct from any pattern of racketeering activity.
Second, the use of the term "such enterprise" helps tie subsection
1962(c) to the rest of the subsections of section 1962 by emphasizing the fact
96 Id. at 265-66. All other courts considering the matter have come to the conclusion that section 1962 is
in fact a proscription against "patterns of racketeering activity." See note 82 supra.
97 605 F.2d at 266.
98 Id.
99 See text accompanying note 61 supra for a discussion of the subsections of 1962 in terms of their
respective impacts upon the entire section's proscriptions of various activities.
100 18 U.S.C. 5 1962 (1976). See note 23 supra.
101 Id.
102 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976) (emphasis added).
103 605 F.2d at 266.
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that the racketeer operation of any enterprise dealt with throughout section
1962 is proscribed by subsection 1962(c). Nevertheless, the court concluded
that "[c]ommon sense" and "the plain meaning of the words in context" indicate that "the reference to 'enterprise' was included to denote an entity
larger than, and conceptually distinct from, any 'pattern of racketeering activi10 4
ty' through which the enterprise's 'affairs' might be conducted.'
Significantly, the court admitted that "the text [of the statute] is no help" in
"determining when racketeers have crossed the line to become a 'criminal
enterprise.' ",105 Since the statute does not even hint at what the standard
should be, it seems logical to conclude that the only standard the statute requires is racketeering activity. Nevertheless, the court rejected the observations
of another court on the nature of enterprises within RICO's coverage, 0 6 and
turned to RICO's legislative history for guidance despite the fact that, by the
court's own startling admission, "unfortunately, [the legislative history does]
not solve the problem ... .
B. The Legislative Histoiy
The court's review of RICO's legislative history centered on various
statements of purpose, endorsements from the Justice Department, committee
reports and floor debates. 08 Each of these sources are of limited value in resolving a specific problem of statutory construction. Formal statements of purpose
tend to be "innocuous generalities designed to offend the least number of people, a fact that destroys most of their usefulness of resolving specific uncertainties of meaning." 10 9 The Justice Department's perception of the statute can
have no logical connection with what Congress intended the statute to mean. 10
Floor debates are, finally, the "least reliable"'1 1 source for interpreting
statutes. From the legislative history, the court concluded "that RICO was
enacted in response to the growing subversion of our society's legitimate institutions of business and labor by organized crime" and not merely "crime for
crime's sake."11 12 According to the court, "RICO's evident purpose was to
single out racketeering activity undertaken in connection with the subversion of
1 3
legitimate institutions."
104

Id.

105 Id.
106 In United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom. Delph v. United States,
439 U.S. 953 (1978), the Fifth Circuit had observed that "criminal enterprise" in RICO could include "an
amoeba-like infrastructure that controls a secret criminal network" Id. at 897-98.
107 605 F.2d at 267.
108 Id. at 267-68.
109 See note 21 supra. "A court should not automatically assume... that a purpose clause precisely and
comprehensively records the actual legislative intent of the statute." R. DICKERSON, supra note 21, at 99. "A
judge would lose little if he closed his eyes entirely to the materials of legislative history, which he is institutionally entitled to do except in those rare instances where specific materials might achieve the status of context." Id. at 175.
110 See text accompanying note 70 supra.
111 R. DICKERSON, supra note 21, at 156.
Any paraphrase of a bill is suspect even in the mouth of a knowledgeable legislator who is uncorrupted
by legislative gamesmanship. . . . Speaking in circumstances that call for gross oversimplification,
[legislators] at best describe only their subjective beliefs about what the bill is supposed to say.
Id.
112 605 F.2d at 268.
113 Id.
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The court's use of legislative history to reach this conclusion is questionable for a number of reasons. First, since the court itself questions the
usefulness of the legislative history in resolving the perceived ambiguity in the
11 4
statute, the reference to the legislative history seems totally unwarranted.
Further, it is possible to read section 1962 in such a way that it can be
understood to proscribe the infiltration of legitimate enterprises as well as the
establishment or operation of totally illegitimate enterprises. 115 Second, the fact
that Congress may have evinced a particular legislative purpose does not mean
that they specifically ruled out any other concomitant purpose. "Even a particular subclass of events is not excluded from a broad legislative intent merely
because the [legislature] did not specifically advert to it.'"116 Thus, the court is
unjustified in asserting that because Congress expressed its intention to rid
legitimate enterprises of the interference of organized crime, Congress did not
intend to attack the purely illegitimate organizations which are a prerequisite to infiltration. Finally, the court's construction of the legislative intent
does not take into account some remarks which hint at a broader purpose for
RICO. For example, in discussing the object of the entire Organized Crime
Control Act, of which RICO was one title, Congressman Poff observed that
people mistakenly speak of organized crime as if it
were a precise and operative legal concept, like murder, rape, or robbery. Actually, of course, it is a functional or sociological concept like white collar or
street crime, serving simply as a shorthand method of referring to a large and
varying group
of individual criminal offenses committed in diverse cir1 17
cumstances.
Although this comment is directed neither specifically at RICO nor the issue of
enterprises covered by RICO, it raises serious doubts as to the validity of the
court's conclusion that the only purpose of Congress in enacting RICO was
proscription of those racketeers actively infiltrating otherwise legitimate enterprises.
Like the Marubeni court, the Sutton court misstated the meaning of the socalled one percent exception to subsection 1962(a). 118 The court incorrectly
assumed that subsection 1962(a) applies only to investment in legitimate enterprises, and ignored the statute's prohibition against establishing or operating
an enterprise. The court concluded therefore, that subsection 1962(b) and (c)
must likewise apply only to legitimate enterprises infiltrated by racketeers.
The court buttressed its reading of RICO by referring to two canons of
judical interpretation. First, the court asserted that "ambiguity concerning the
ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity." 1 19 The
soundest rationale for such a rule is that all potential violators are entitled to
114 "Apart from constitutional considerations, beliet in the existence and significance of legislative intent
involves no commitment to examining any specific kind ofevidence ....There is certainly no constitutional
obligation to consult inappropriate evidence." R. DICKERSON, supra note 21, at 84.
115 See text accompanying notes 98-104 supra.
116 McCallum, Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L. J., 754, 772 (1966).
117 116 CONG. REc. 35344 (1970) (Remarks of Rep. Poll).
118 See text accompanying notes 54-60 supra.
119 605 F.2d at 269, citing Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971).
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fair warning. 120 Those crimes involving acts that are wrong only because they
have been officially proscribed (malum prohibitum) require independent warnings and should be strictly construed against the state. 1 1 However, since
RICO's predicate crimes 122 are acts generally assumed to be antisocial (malum
in se), in which a warning tends to inhere in the act itself, there seems little
point in exploiting every semantic or syntactic uncertainty of the statute
23
against the state.
Second, the court asserted that "unless Congress conveys its purpose
clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state
balance." 24 The court seemed to indicate that it was concerned with the right
of individual states to enforce their own criminal laws. However, in light of
states' continued ability to prosecute RICO violators for the predicate offenses
constituting the pattern of racketeering activity, the actual impact of the
superimposition of a federal penalty seems minimal at best. 125 Also, the court's
admission that Congress could doubtless exercise such power seems to render
the issue insignificant.
To conclude, the Sutton court's reading of both the statutory language and
legislative history of RICO is inadequate and results in an unnecessary and illconceived restriction upon RICO's scope.
V. Conclusion
The Mandel, Marubeni and Sutton decisions threaten both RICO's viability
as a weapon against criminal enterprises and the constitutionally mandated
separation of powers between Congress and the courts. Under Mandel, if a corporation is transferred to racketeers in return for unconnected racketeering activity, the transferors are able to gain the benefits of racketeering activity
without coming within the scope of RICO. Under Marubeni, an enterprise may
successfully retain its racketeer acquired income while a parade of lower-level
functionaries go to jail, buoyed by the prospect of returning to an enterprise
which remained intact and prospered during their enforced absence. Under
Sutton, as long as a totally illict enterprise is able to destroy a legitimate competitor by totally illegal means, the illicit enterprise is immune from RICO.
More significantly, the Mandel, Marubeni and Sutton courts each base their
restrictive readings of RICO on interpretations of RICO's legislative history
rather than open-minded readings of the statute itself. When a court finds a
statute ambiguous, the court should consult specific discussions of that ambiguity in the legislative history to resolve the matter. In Mandel, Marubeni, and
Sutton, however, the courts have gone directly to the legislative history before
trying to discern the statute's meaning from its language. The courts also failed

120 Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes, 48 HARV. L. REv. 748, 758-59 (1935).
121 R. DICKERSON, supra note 21, at 209.
122 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l) (1976).
123 R. DicKERSON, supra note 21, at 211.
124 605 F.2d at 220.
125 See, e.g., United States v. Aleman 609 F.2d 298, 306 (7th Cir. 1979) cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3611
(U.S. March 25, 1980) (No. 79-1009), in which a convicted RICO offender was sentenced in a state court
for a predicate offense of robbery.
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to establish that the statute is ambiguous or that the legislative history deals
with that ambiguity in a sufficiently specific manner. There is simply no
discussion by Congress of whether payment for unconnected racketeering by
means of an interest in an enterprise is proscribed (Mandel), whether racketeering income is a forfeitable interest (Marubeni) or whether purely illegitimate
enterprises (Sutton) are within RICO's scope.
Arguably, the courts first created an uncertainty not apparent on the face
of the statute and then "resolved" that uncertainty by referring to a legislative
history which in no way addresses the particular issues. In so doing, the courts,
in effect, substituted their judgment on these issues for that of the Congress.
The continued use of such haphazard procedures by the courts in construing
RICO threatens the statute's continued viability as well as the separation of
powers between Congress' duty to enact statutes and the judiciary's duty to apply those statutes as written.
William D. Fearnow

